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Abstract
We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot
strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a
game and identication in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of
two versions of the prisoners dilemma game where the attractiveness of the uncooperative
action is manipulated. We refer to the version with a relatively attractive uncooperative
action as the Mean Game and the other as the Nice Game. Note that choice is relatively
more di¢ cult in the Nice Game as a result of the smaller di¤erence between the payo¤s
associated the actions. We nd that the strategic nature of the game a¤ects the strength
of identity. Specically, we nd that in the Mean Game there is little di¤erence in the
change in identication of those playing cooperatively and those playing uncooperatively.
However, in the Nice Game those playing cooperatively exhibit a signicantly stronger
change in identication than those playing uncooperatively. We also present evidence
regarding the timing of the change in identity and what causes this change. In particular,
the decision di¢ culty literature is helpful in interpreting the results.
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1 Introduction
Social preferences of players in a strategic game are of fundamental importance to the analysis
of that game. Even if players consider the welfare of other players, it is assumed that
preferences are unchanged throughout the play of a one-shot game. In this paper, we test
the assumption that these preferences are indeed unchanged. Specially, we ask whether
social preferences can be a¤ected by the strategic nature of the game, even without feedback
concerning the action of the opponent. We measure these preferences by employing a standard
measure of identity. Consistent with the literature, we interpret the measure of identity as
suggesting the extent to which a subject values the outcomes of others.
In our experiment, each subject plays one of two versions of a prisoners dilemma game
and we measure their identity. In both versions of the game, each subject decides to take a
cooperative action or an uncooperative action. In one version of the game, the uncooperative
action is relatively more attractive than in the other version. We refer to the game with the
relatively attractive uncooperative action as the Mean Game and the other as the Nice Game.
The choice in the Nice Game is relatively more di¢ cult than that in the Mean Game because
of the smaller di¤erence between the payo¤s associated the actions.
We allocate subjects into groups based on a trivial criterion. Before the subjects are aware
of the strategic setting, we take a baseline measure of identity. Subjects are then presented
with either the Mean or Nice Game. Before the subjects decide on their action, their group
identity is again measured. The subjects then make a choice of action in the game and we
take nal identity measure.
The rst contribution of this paper entails evidence of the relationship between the game
type and action choice as a¤ecting identity. Specically, we nd that when playing another
ingroup member, the change in identity for those playing cooperatively and uncooperatively
in the Nice Game is signicantly di¤erent, whereas there is no such relationship in the Mean
Game (Result 1). The second contribution is the specication of the timing of the change.
We present evidence that the change in identity which does occur, does not happen upon
initial inspection of the game but rather largely after the action choice has been made (Result
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2). The third contribution involves evidence regarding the cause of this change. We nd
that identity is enhanced by actions which are considered to be less competitive and more
cooperative (Result 3).
These results are best understood with the insights from the decision di¢ culty literature.
Research has found that when a subject makes a choice from a set of alternatives, the decision
di¢ culty is related to post-decision evaluation of the options (Ariely & Norton, 2007; Bodner
& Prelec, 2003; Liberman & Forster, 2006; Sharot et. al., 2009; Shultz et. al., 1996; Shultz &
Lepper, 1999; Ste¤el, 2009). In particular, the research indicates that more di¢ cult decisions
will be associated with a larger post-decision spread in the evaluation of the selected and not
selected options.
Our results are similar as the identity change which does occur, happens after the decision
is made (Result 2) and is particularly large after a di¢ cult decision (Result 1). In the Mean
Game, most participants select the uncooperative action, whereas in the Nice Game there
is a more even distribution of choices. This supports our contention that the decision in
the Nice Game is more di¢ cult than that in the Mean Game. Consistent with the decision
di¢ culty literature, we nd that there is a signicant di¤erence in the change in identity for
those playing uncooperatively in the Nice Game and those playing cooperatively, however no
such relationship exists in the Mean Game.
The results of this paper have signicant implications for the study of games. Our results
suggest that the analysis of a one-shot game without feedback must consider that identity
might not be constant throughout the interaction. Additionally, our results suggest that
techniques which measure social preferences through observing allocation choices (such as
Social Value Orientation) could possibly a¤ect the very preferences which these techniques
are designed to measure.
1.1 Measurement of Identity
For some time, researchers have known that allocating people into groups will often induce
behavior which favors ingroup members at the expense of outgroup members (Tajfel, 1970;
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Tajfel et. al., 1971; Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner
& Bourhis, 1996). A typical such experiment would allocate subjects into a group and
observe ingroup favoritism or outgroup discrimination. Such behavior was thought to be
more pronounced when identity was more e¤ectively manipulated. However, in order to
verify the e¤ectiveness of the manipulation, experimenters would seek to measure the identity
of the subject (Abrams & Hogg, 1999; Brown et. al., 1986; Gaertner et. al., 1989; Grieve
& Hogg, 1999; Hogg et. al., 1993; Hogg & Grieve, 1999; Hogg & Hardie, 1991,1992; Reid &
Hogg, 2005; Swann et. al., 2003).
Subsequent identity research sought to clarify which features of the group or the envi-
ronment would induce such behavior and what motivates subjects to categorize themselves
in terms of the social group. Research has indicated that group distinctiveness (Brewer,
1991), group prestige (Ellemers et. al., 2002), similarity (Ip, Chiu & Wan, 2006), common
fate (Brown & Wade, 1987), interpersonal interaction (Pettigrew, 1998) and group homogene-
ity (Vanbeselaere, 1991) can all a¤ect the identication of a person with a social group. A
contribution of our research is the nding that the strategic nature of the game should be
added to the list. Also, to our knowledge, we are the only paper to measure identity multiple
times throughout the experiment. In the event that there is a change in identity, this allows
us to determine when the change occurs.
Similar to identity, Social Value Orientation (SV O) (Griesinger & Livingston, 1973) seeks
to learn the social preferences of subjects by observing a series of allocation decisions. It seems
that SV O is better suited as a measure of the general disposition of a subject rather than
as a measure of the disposition towards a particular person (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999;
De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; De Cremer et. al., 2008). An advantage of measuring social
preferences through techniques such as SV O is that the responses are incentive compatible: a
subject receives payment on the basis of their decisions and therefore has a material incentive
to respond truthfully. However, the results presented here suggest that it is possible that
eliciting preferences through techniques such as SV O might a¤ect the very preferences which
they are designed to measure.
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1.2 Interpretation of Identity Measure
Research has suggested that, in settings similar to that in our experiment, there is a link
between group identication and bias.1 For instance, Perrault and Bourhis (1999) nd that
subjects who identify more strongly with a group, treated ingroup members more favorably
and outgroup members less favorably (also see Ando, 1999; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Voci,
2006). Therefore, we interpret the identity measure of a subject as indicating the extent to
which the subject positively values the material payo¤s of an ingroup member.
1.3 Identity and Games
There is a growing interest in identity research in games .2 Within this literature, it is not
uncommon for the experimenter to manipulate some feature of the environment, which the
authors ascribe as having a¤ected the identity of the subject (Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Brewer
& Kramer, 1986; Dawes et. al., 1988; Wit & Wilke, 1992; Aguiar et. al., 2007). The authors
typically observe the inuence of this manipulation on the behavior in games. For instance,
Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007) manipulate the saliency of groups by allowing ingroup
members to view behavior or by connecting the payo¤s of ingroup members. Eckel and
Grossman (2005) observes that subjects in treatments with strong identity manipulations
contribute more in repeated public goods games than in treatments with weak manipulations.
Ahmed (2007), Chen and Li (2009) and McLeish and Oxoby (2007) observe the di¤erence in
outcomes of games played between ingroup and outgroup members. We primarily distinguish
our paper from these papers in two respects. First, we do not directly manipulate identity.
Second, we examine the relationship between social identication and the strategic nature of
a game.
To our knowledge, Guth, Levati and Ploner (2008) is the only other paper which employs
an established measure of identity in games. The authors investigate the relationship between
1Although the relationship between identity and biased behavior is well understood in settings similar to
ours, there is no consensus on the relationship in general settings. See Turner (1999) and Brown (2000) for a
spirited discussion on the matter.
2For work involving real social groups, see Benjamin et. al. (2007), Ben-Ner et.al. (2006), Ferraro and
Cummings (2007), Goette et. al. (2006) and Ho¤ and Pandey (2006).
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identity and behavior in an investment game. Specically, the authors place subjects into
groups (X or Y ) and direct some to play a public goods game. This second step is designed
to manipulate the identication of the subjects, which they subsequently measure.3 The
authors nd that subjects who contribute more in the public goods game are signicantly
more trusting in the subsequent investment game. We present a result with a similar avor:
those who play cooperatively against an ingroup member in the Nice Game have a signicantly
larger change in identity than those playing uncooperatively in the Nice Game.
Carpenter (2005) is one of the few papers to explicitly investigate the extent to which a
competitive strategic environment can a¤ect social preferences.4 However, there are funda-
mental methodological di¤erences between the papers. For instance, the subjects in Carpenter
receive feedback regarding the action of their opponents. In our paper, there is no feedback
therefore the change in identity which we nd can only be attributed to the nature of the
game and the action selected by the subject. Like Carpenter, we measure preferences both
before and after the actions have been selected, however we use the identical measure. By
contrast, Carpenter uses Value Orientation (V O)5 to obtain an ex-ante measurement and the
technique of Andreoni and Miller (2002) to obtain an ex-post measurement.
2 Experiment
2.1 Procedure
A total of 130 undergraduate students at a public university in the northeast United States
participated in the experiment for course credit and entry into a lottery for a cash prize. The
trials were conducted in six classes of 19, 34, 37, 10, 11 and 19 students. In each trial, the
same male experimenter provided the instructions to the subjects.6 In accordance with the
3Although Guth et. al. (2008) use items adapted from Gaertner et. al. (1989) rather than, as we do,
Grieve and Hogg (1999).
4See Canegallo et. al. (2008) for a related paper. Also, Schotter et. al. (1996) examines the e¤ect of
framing on judgements of fairness and is motivated by questions related to endogenous identity. Finally, see
Bowles (1998) for more on endogenous preferences.
5Another measure of social preferences, similar to SV O.
6The instructions were presented via Power Point slides. These slides are available from the corresponding
author upon request.
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minimal group literature, we placed students into groups labeled "X" and "Y " (Oakes &
Turner, 1980), where the allocation was based on the last digit of the students identication
number. Students with digits 0  4 were placed into group X and students with digits 5  9
were placed into group Y .
Before the subjects played the game, we familiarized the subjects with 2 2 games. Our
experimental manipulation was the nature of the prisoners dilemma game. Roughly half of
each class was given the Mean Game and half the Nice Game.7
Mean Game
Someone Else
You
C D
C 100; 100 0; 150
D 150; 0 50; 50
Nice Game
Someone Else
You
C D
C 100; 100 45; 105
D 105; 45 50; 50
Subjects were told that they were to play the game with every student in their class, in
the same group who received the same game. The subjects were instructed that they were
only able to make a single choice to be used against each ingroup opponent. The subjects
were notied that the points attained in these matches would be converted into an average
which would go towards a lottery for a prize of $50 which would be conducted in a future class
meeting. Note that incentives work in the same direction as if we used the result of only a
single match. However, payo¤s depend on the distribution of choices made by the subjects
rather than on the outcome of a single interaction and this would seem to be more transparent
to the subject.
7The subjects were not aware of our name of the games (ie. Nice Game and Mean Game) as this label
could a¤ect behavior. For instance, Liberman et. al. (2004) show that referring to a prisoners dilemma game
as the "Wall Street Game" induces less cooperative behavior than referring to it as the "Community Game."
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2.2 Identication Measure
Our measure of identity was adapted from Grieve and Hogg (1999). We asked the subjects,
how much do you like being a member of a group, how much do you feel that you belong to
the group, how strong are your ties to the group, how pleased are you to belong to the group,
how important is the group to you and how much do you identify with the group. These 6
questions were asked on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated a negative preference, 4 indicated
"no opinion" and 7 indicated a positive preference. We used these items as they are standard
in the literature and appropriate in a minimal group setting.
2.3 Competitive and Cooperative Measures
We also seek a measure of the competitive and cooperative nature of the subjects and their
assessment of the competitive and cooperative nature of their choice of action in the game.
The items of our competitiveness measure were adapted from Beersma and DeDreu (1999).
Subjects were provided the following statements, I selected my action only considering my own
welfare and I selected my action so that my outcome is relatively better than the outcome
for my opponents. The subjects were asked to respond to these 2 statements on a scale of
1 to 7, where 1 indicated "strongly disagree", 4 indicated "neither agree nor disagree" and 7
indicated "strongly agree."
Likewise, the items of our cooperation measure were adapted from Beersma and DeDreu
(1999). Subjects were provided the following statements, I selected my action so that my
opponents can depend on me, I selected my action considering how my decisions a¤ect the
welfare of my opponents, I selected my action so that my opponents and I received the best
joint outcome. The subjects were asked to respond to these 3 statements on a scale of 1
to 7, where 1 indicated "strongly disagree", 4 indicated "neither agree nor disagree" and 7
indicated "strongly agree."
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2.4 Timeline
We refer to Time 1 as the period in which the subject has been allocated into a group,
but does not know the form of the game (Nice or Mean) to be played. In Time 1 we
ask standard background questions, in addition to seeking a baseline measurement of group
identity, competitiveness and cooperativeness. We refer to Time 2 as the period in which the
subject has seen the game to be played but before a choice of action has been made. In Time
2 we measure group identity. In the beginning of Time 3, the subject selects an action for
the game. Thereafter, we take a competitive and cooperative measure of the perception of
the action of the subject by using an appropriate adaptation of the items. Additionally, in
Time 3 we measure group identity a nal time.
Every response was entered on paper. In order to minimize biasing the subjects towards
previous answers, we collected each sheet after its completion. Additionally, we color coded
the pages so that the we could verify that the subject adhered to the procedure.
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation Check
First, we may ask whether the manipulation induced di¤erent action choices. Participants
in the Mean Game condition were more likely to chose the uncooperative choice (42 of 62,
67:7%) and participants in the Nice Game condition were more likely to chose the cooperative
choice (37 of 68, 54:4%), 2 (1; 129) = 6:465, p = :0110.
3.2 Identity
The average of the 6 identity questions forms our measure of identity. Our Cronbach alphas
for identity in Time 1, Time 2 and Time 3 are 0:810, 0:858 and 0:885, respectively. Our
Cronbach alphas for cooperativeness in Time 1 and Time 3 are 0:74 and 0:74, respectively.
Our Cronbach alphas for competitiveness in Time 1 and Time 3 are 0:55 and 0:76, respectively.
Table 1 presents a summary of the data by listing the mean identity (and variance in the
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parenthesis) according to the action selected at Time 3 and the game type in Time 1, Time 2
and Time 3.
MT1 MT2 MT3 NT1 NT2 NT3
C 4:232 4:246 4:133 4:351 4:288 4:396
(1:117) (1:054) (1:297) (1:208) (0:922) (1:010)
D 4:194 4:238 4:067 4:074 3:887 3:752
(0:725) (0:838) (1:171) (0:522) (0:762) (1:259)
Total 4:206 4:2401 4:088 4:225 4:105 4:103
(0:835) (0:891) (1:192) (0:902) (0:877) (1:211)
Table 1: Mean identity by game type and action
We note that the action choice a¤ects the identity of subjects. Time 3 identity is sig-
nicantly di¤erent for those who played C and those who played D (t = 1:938, p = 0:053).
However, there is no signicant di¤erence of identity at Time 1 or Time 2 for those playing C
or D.
No signicant relationship with identity exists between those received the Nice Game and
those who received the Mean Game. However, signicant relationships emerge when we
restrict attention within a game treatment. For those who received the Nice Game, there is
a signicant di¤erence (t = 2:470, p = 0:0163) between the Time 3 identity of those playing
C and those playing D. Similarly, among those who received the Nice Game, there is a
signicant di¤erence (t = 1:803, p = 0:0759) between the Time 2 identity of those playing C
and those playing D. An ANOVA of identity at Time 3, with independent variables game
type, choice and an interaction term (F = 2:019, p = 0:115) indicates that the choice term is
signicant (F = 3:255, p = 0:074). However, no such signicant relationship exists for those
who received the Mean Game.
Although we have found a signicant relationship between absolute levels of identity, per-
haps it is worthwhile to consider the di¤erences in identity. Indeed, among those receiving
the Nice Game, there is a signicant di¤erence in the change in identity between Time 1 and
Time 3 for those who played C and those who played D (t = 1:862, p = 0:0686). Again, no
such signicant relationship exists for those who received the Mean Game. We summarize
this evidence by the following result.
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Result 1: For those who received the Nice Game, the subjects who played C identied
signicantly more with the group over time than those who played D. For those who received
the Mean Game, there was no di¤erence in identication for those who played C or D.
3.3 Timing of Changes
A natural question is then, when do these changes in identity occur Does the change occur
between Time 1 and Time 2? Or does the change occur between Time 2 and Time 3? If the
change occurs between Time 1 and 2 then it would seem that the subjects correctly anticipated
their subsequent choice and that the act of executing the choice did not signicantly a¤ect
their identity. However, if the change occurs between Time 2 and 3 then the act of executing
the choice signicantly a¤ected their identity. A t-test between the di¤erence in Time 2 and
Time 3 identity of those who received the Nice Game and played C and those who received
the Nice Game who played D is signicant at the 10% level of a one-sided test (t = 1:63,
p = 0:109)8. Similarly, a t-test between di¤erence in Time 1 and Time 2 identity of those who
received the Nice Game and played C and those who received the Nice Game who played D
is not signicant (t = 0:757, p = 0:452). On the basis of the above we infer that most of the
changes occur between Time 2 and Time 3. Therefore, the evidence supports the contention
that the act of making the selection a¤ects identity and that the subjects do not correctly
anticipate their choice. We summarize this by the following result.
Result 2: The change in identication which did occur, happened primarily between Time
2 and Time 3 rather than between Time 1 and Time 2.
3.4 Competitiveness and Cooperativeness
Recall that at Time 1, a baseline measurement of competitiveness and cooperativeness is
taken. Then at Time 3, we make a measurement of the perception of the competitiveness
and cooperativeness of the action taken. We take the di¤erence between these Time 1 and
Time 3 measurements to better understand how the subject considers the action undertaken.
8These numerical values are for a two-sided test.
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Table 2 lists the mean values (with variance in parenthesis) below.
Mean Di¤erence in Competitiveness
Comp 3  1 M N Total
C  0:0167  0:374  0:249
(1:783) (1:724) (1:743)
D 0:881 1:430 1:114
(1:284) (1:557) (1:454)
Total 0:5914 0:4485 0:5617
(1:597) (2:443) (2:029)
Mean Di¤erence in Cooperativeness
Coop 3  1 M N Total
C  1:325  0:831  1:004
(2:231) (2:469) (2:401)
D  1:845  2:218  2:003
(1:890) (2:378) (2:102)
Total  1:677  1:463  1:565
(2:025) (2:875) (2:463)
Table 2: Mean Di¤erence in Time 1 and Time 3 Competitiveness and Cooperativeness by
action and game type
First, we ask how the subject considers the actions taken. Across both games, playing C
is considered to be more cooperative than playing D (t = 3:75, p < 0:001). Also across both
games, playing C is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  6:064, p < 0:001).
Therefore, we regard the choice of C as more cooperative and less competitive than the choice
of D.
Within the Mean Game, playing C is considered to be more cooperative than playing D
(t = 1:315, p = 0:197) although this result is insignicant. Also in the Mean Game, playing
C is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  2:594, p = 0:0142). However,
these e¤ects are stronger in the Nice Game. In the Nice Game, playing C is considered to
be more cooperative than playing D (t = 3:661, p < 0:001). In the Nice Game, playing C
is considered to be less competitive than playing D (t =  5:797, p < 0:001). Within each
game, playing C is considered to be more cooperative and less competitive than playing D,
however in the Nice game these di¤erences are more pronounced. We summarize this by the
following result.
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Result 3: The di¤erence in the perception of the competitiveness and cooperativeness of
playing C and playing D was larger in the Nice Game.
3.5 Discussion
Although we see less cooperation in the Mean Game than in the Nice Game, we see no
signicant di¤erence in the change in identity between the two treatments. However, we
observe in Result 1 that the di¤erence in the change in identity for those playing C and D is
larger in the Nice Game treatment than in the Mean Game treatment. We view this result as
arising from the condition that subjects have an imperfect understanding of their own social
preferences and they make an inference of these preferences based on the action selected. The
di¤erential e¤ect is consistent with the literature as the choice in the Nice Game is more
di¢ cult than that in the Mean Game.
Result 2 demonstrates that the change in identity, primarily occurs only after the action
is selected. This result o¤ers further support for our contention that the subject has an
imperfect understanding of their own social preferences and their future action. For this
reason, we view Result 2 as supporting our interpretation of Result 1.
The evidence above suggests that taking an action which is considered to be less compet-
itive or more cooperative tends to be associated with a larger positive change in identity. As
playing C is considered to be more cooperative and less competitive than playing D, we see
the former exhibiting a stronger identity than the latter. Further, Result 3 demonstrates that
the di¤erence in the perception of cooperativeness and competitiveness for playing C and D
is larger in the Nice Game than in the Mean Game.
4 Conclusion
We have provided evidence related to the endogenous nature of identity in games. We have
found that the identity of a subject is a¤ected by the action taken and the strategic setting
in which the action was taken. Those subjects who received the Nice Game and played C
had a signicantly stronger change in identity than those who received the Nice Game and
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played D. Additionally, we have found that the identity change which does occur, happens
primarily after the subject selects an action. Finally, we presented evidence that the change
in identity is strengthened by actions which are considered to be less competitive and more
cooperative. We view the evidence presented here as challenging the assumption that social
preferences are constant throughout a one-shot strategic game without feedback.
Our results have signicant implications for the study of games. As we have demon-
strated that preferences are not constant throughout the play of a one-shot game without
feedback, the assumption otherwise needs to used with caution. Further, our results suggest
that measuring other-regarding preferences with techniques such as SV O might a¤ect the very
preferences which they are designed to measure. In our experiment other-regarding prefer-
ences, as measured by identity, changed in a manner which depended on the specication of
the prisoners dilemma game and the action selected. It is possible that these e¤ects also
occur when the subjects make a series of allocation decisions as is the case for measurement
of other-regarding preferences via techniques such as SV O. If this is the case then measuring
preferences by SV O might a¤ect those preferences which they are designed to measure. We
hope future work will address this question.
It is worth reecting on the limitations of the present study and the possibilities for future
work. Here, there was no feedback regarding the action of the opponents. It is unclear how
feedback, or the anticipation of the feedback, would a¤ect the change in identication. Also,
the experiment only contained a single play of the game. It is unclear how the endogenous
identity described in this experiment would a¤ect future behavior in a repeated decision set-
ting. It is possible that the new identity would revert back to its original form thus not
a¤ecting behavior or perhaps the endogenous identity would have a lasting inuence on be-
havior.9 It is also not clear how the results of this study apply to other standard games.
Additionally, it is unclear how the results apply to groups which are not minimal. It is
possible that minimal group members display either a more or less malleable identity than
members of less trivial groups. Hopefully, future work can clarify these issues.
Finally, note that playing D rather than C in the Mean Game yields the subject a gain
9Although the reults of Sharot et. al. (2007) suggest that these e¤ects are lasting.
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50 points while costing the opponent 100 points. Playing D rather than C in the Nice Game
yields the subject a gain 5 points while costing the opponent 50 points. It is unclear exactly
how each of these gains and costs individually a¤ects the change in identication of the subject.
We hope that future work can tease out this relationship.
15
5 References
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. (1999). Social identity and social cognition. Blackwell Publishers:
Walden MA.
Aguiar, F., Branas-Garza, P., Espinosa, M.P., & Miller, L. (2007). Personal identity in
the dictator game. Working paper, Max Planck Institute.
Ahmed, A. (2007). Group identity, social distance and intergroup bias. Journal of Eco-
nomic Psychology, 28, 324-337.
Ariely, D., & Norton, M. (2007). How actions create-not just reveal-preferences. Trends
in Cognitive Science, 12(1), 13-16.
Ando, K. (1999). Social identication and a solution to social dilemmas. Asian Journal
of Social Psychology, 2, 227-235.
Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the
consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, 70(2), 737-753.
Beersma, B., & De Dreu, C. (1999). Negotiation processes and outcomes in prosocially and
egoistically motivated groups. International Journal of Conict Management, 10(4), 385-402.
Benjamin, D., Choi, J., & Strickland, J. (2007). Social identity and preferences. Working
paper, Cornell University and Yale University.
Ben-Ner, A., McCall, B., Massoud, S., & Wang, H. (2006). Identity and self-other di¤er-
entiation in work and giving behaviors: Experimental evidence. Working paper, University of
Minnesota.
Bodner, R., & Prelec, D. (2003). Self-signaling and diagnostic utility in everyday decision
making. In I. Brocas & J. Carrillo (Eds.), The psychology of economic decision, Oxford
University Press, New York.
16
Bowles, S. (1998). Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and
other economic institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 75-111.
Branscombe, N., & Wann, D. (1994). Collective self-esteem consequences of outgroup
derogation when a valued social identity is on trial. European Journal of Social Psychology,
24, 641-657.
Brewer, M. (1991). The social self: On being the same and di¤erent at the same time.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(5), 75-82.
Brewer, M., & Kramer, R. (1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: E¤ects of social
identity, group size and framing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(3), 543-549.
Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future
challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30, 745-778.
Brown, R., Condor, S., Mathews, A., Wade, G., & Williams, J. (1986). Explaining inter-
group di¤erentiation in an industrial organization. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59,
273-286.
Brown, R., & Wade, G. (1987). Superordinate goals and intergroup behavior: The e¤ect
of role ambiguity and status on intergroup attitudes and task performance. European Journal
of Social Psychology, 17(2), 131-142.
Canegallo, C., Ortona, G., Ottone, S., Ponzaono, F., & Scacciati, F. (2008). Competition
versus cooperation: Some experimental evidence. Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 18-30.
Carpenter, J. (2005). Endogenous social preferences. Review of Radical Political Eco-
nomics, 37(1), 63-84.
Charness, G., Rigotti, L., & Rustichini, A. (2007). Individual behavior and group mem-
bership. American Economic Review, 97(4), 1340-1352.
17
Chen, Y., & Li, X. (2009). Group identity and social preferences. American Economic
Review, 99(1), 431-457.
Dawes, R., Van de Kragt, A., & Orbell, J. (1988). Not me or thee but we: The importance
of group identity in eliciting cooperation in dilemma situations: Experimenal manipulations.
Acta Psychologica, 68, 82-97.
De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2002). Reactions to group success and failure as a function
of identication level: A test of the goal-transformation hypothesis in social dilemmas. Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 435-442.
De Cremer, D., Van Knippenberg, D., Van Dijk, E., & Van Leeuwen, E. (2008). Coop-
erating if ones goals are collective-based: Social identication e¤ects in social dilemmas as a
function of goal transformation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(6), 1562-1579.
De Cremer, D., & Van Vugt, M. (1999). Social identication e¤ects in social dilemmas: A
transformation of motives. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29, 871-893.
Eckel, C., & Grossman, P. (2005). Managing diversity by creating team identity. Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58(3), 371-392.
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self and social identity. Annual Review of
Psychology, 53, 161-186.
Ferraro, P., & Cummings, R. (2007). Cultural diversity, discrimination, and economic
outcomes: An experimental analysis. Economic Inquiry, 45(2), 217-232.
Gaertner, S., Mann, J., Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. (1989). Reducing intergroup bias: The
benets of recategorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(2), 239-249.
Goette, L., Hu¤man, D., & Meier, S. (2006). The impact of group membership on co-
operation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social groups.
American Economic Review, 96(2), 212-216.
18
Griesinger, D., & Livingston, J. (1973). Toward a model of interpersonal motivation in
experimental games. Behavioral Science, 18(3), 173-188.
Grieve, P., & Hogg, M. (1999). Subjective uncertainty and intergroup discrimination in
the minimal group situation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(8), 926-940.
Guth, W., Levati, M., & Ploner, M. (2008). Social identity and trust: An experimental
investigation. Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 1293-1308.
Ho¤, K., & Pandey, P. (2006). Discrimination, social identity and durable inequalities.
American Economic Review, 96(2), 206-211.
Hogg, M., Cooper-Shaw, L., & Holzworth, D. (1993). Group prototypicality and deper-
sonalized attraction in small interactive groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
19, 452-465.
Hogg, M., & Grieve, P. (1999). Social identity theory and the crisis of condence in social
psychology: A commentary, and some research on uncertainty reduction. Asian Journal of
Social Psychology, 2, 79-93.
Hogg, M., & Hardie, E. (1991). Social attraction, personal attraction and self-categorization:
A eld study. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 175-180.
Hogg, M., & Hardie, E. (1992). Prototypicality, conformity and depersonalized attraction:
A Self-Categorization Analysis of Group Cohesiveness. British Journal of Social Psychology,
31, 41-56.
Ip, G., Chiu, C.Y., & Wan, C. (2006). Birds of a feather and birds ocking together:
Physical versus behavioral cues may lead to trait- versus goal-based group perception. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 368-381.
Kramer, R., & Brewer, M. (1984). E¤ects of group identity on resource use in a simulated
commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46(5), 1044-1057.
19
Liberman, V., Sammuels, S., & Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game: Predictive
power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoners dilemma game moves.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1175-1185.
Leberman, N., & Forster, J. (2006). Inferences from decision di¢ culty. Journal of Exper-
imental Social Psycholgy, 42, 290-301.
McLeish, K., & Oxoby, R. (2007). Identity, cooperation and punishment. Working paper,
University of Calgary and IZA.
Oakes, P., & Turner J.C. (1980). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour: Does
minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity more positive. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 10, 295-301.
Perreault, S., & Bourhis, R. (1999). Ethnocentrism, social identication, and discrimina-
tion. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 92-103.
Pettigrew, T. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 65-85.
Reid, S., & Hogg, M. (2005). Uncertainty reduction, self-enhancement and ingroup iden-
tication. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 804-817.
Schotter, A., Weiss, A., & Zapater, I. (1996). Fairness and survival in ultimatum and
dictatorship Games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 31, 37-56.
Sharot, T., De Martino, B., & Dolan, R. (2009). How choice reveals, and shapes, expected
hedonic outcome. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(12), 3760-3765.
Shultz, T., & Lepper, M. (1996). Cognitive dissonance reduction as constraint satisfaction.
Psychological Review, 103(2), 219-240.
Shultz, T., Leveille, E., & Lepper, M. (1999). Free choice and cognitive dissonance revis-
ited: Choosing lesser evilsversus greater goods. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
25(1), 40-48.
20
Ste¤el, M. (2009). The impact of choice di¢ culty on self and social preferences. Unpub-
lished dissertation, Princeton University.
Swann, W., Kwan, V., Polzer, J., & Milton, L. (2003). Fostering group identication and
creativity in diverse groups: The role of individuation and self-verication. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(11), 1396-1406.
Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. Scientic American, 223,
96-102.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Di¤erentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology
of intergroup relations. London, Academic Press.
Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M., & Bundy, R. (1971). Social categorization and inter-
group behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-178.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conict. In W.G.Austin
and S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations. Monterey, CA, Brooks/Cole,
33-48. Reprinted (2001) in M. Hogg and D. Abrams (Eds.), Intergroup relations. Ann Arbor,
MI, Psychology Press, 94-109.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S.
Worchel and W. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations. Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 7-25.
Turner, J. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity. In N. Ellemers,
R. Spears & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity: Context, commitment, content. Malden, MA,
Blackwell, 6-34.
Turner, J., & Bourhis, R. (1996). Social identity, interdependence and the social group:
A reply to Rabie et. al. In W. P. Robinson (Ed.), Social groups and identities. Boston,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 25-63.
Vanbeselaere, N. (1991). The impact of in-group and out-group homogeneity/heterogeneity
upon intergroup relations. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 12(3), 291-301.
21
Voci, A. (2006). The link between identication and in-group favourtism: E¤ects of threat
to social identity and trust-related emotions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 265-284.
Wit, A., & Wilke, H. (1992). The e¤ect of social categorization on cooperation, in three
types of social dilemmas. Journal of Economic Psychology, 13, 135-151.
22
